Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume What Is a Person? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, , pp.
Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral Good from the Person Up Central to it is his claim that human persons are real, objective, albeit .. under evolutionism's explanatory supremacy ends up reading to me as a. What Is a Person?: Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral Good from the Person Up Paperback – November 30, by.
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Smith examines the philosophical and anthropological underpinnings of sociology, and much of my delight likely stems from his choice of philosophical perspectives.
He fuses the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar, a strain of philosophical personalism,an anti-naturalistic phenomenological epistemology relying on In a field packed with heavy hitters Peter Brown, Roy Bhaskar, and Peter Burke, Christian Smith's What is a Person? He fuses the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar, a strain of philosophical personalism,an anti-naturalistic phenomenological epistemology relying on Charles Taylor's concept of the "best account," and a natural-law friendly form of virtue ethics into a formidable theoretical program.
The dam was eventually built, but what today seems no less significant is that so many people fought to prevent its completion. Goldthwait Berkeley: Univ. Return to Book Page. What Is a Person? Whither Islamophobia? There is a paradox here, of course. Brave, hospitable, hardy, and adventurous, he is the grim pioneer of our race; he prepares the way for the civilization from before whose face he must himself disappear.
From this perspective he critiques and reformulates sociological methods. The book is divided into three parts. The first sketches Smith's definition of a person and his philosophical commitments. The second uses those commitments to critique strong social constructionism, network structuralism, and variables analysis. The third is titled "constructive development," but only the first chapter on social structures is directly related to the practice of sociology; the final two chapters turn back toward philosophical grounding. The great strength of this book is the consistent application of the initial premises across so many domains of social science.
Smith's breadth of mind allows him to weave interdisciplinary strands into a surprising, insightful tapestry. One recovers some hope that theory and practice really can influence each other, that reality and our discourse about it really intersect.
My favorite chapter is the critique of variables analysis. In it Smith demonstrates his ability to incorporate information from many sources into his philosophical program. Critical realism emerges in this chapter as a capable basis for both criticism and constructive engagement. Smith's style is both clear and interesting. He is proficient in didactic illustrations.
His logic is incisive. The book is not an easy read, but this is because of the quantity of likely new terms and information, not any failure of explanation on Smith's part. On the other hand, he tends to wordiness. I began to wonder if he possessed a right ring finger, for he seemed to require a concentrated effort to strike the period key rather than the comma. Still, when he goes into "list mode," it's a simple fix to skip down to the next paragraph.
That same fix works for his frequent recapitulations. Smith's willingness to put his premises on the line can serve only to advance the discussion of the theory of the social sciences. Apr 06, Weronika Janczuk rated it it was amazing. Had their conclusions been right, they probably could not have come to them in the first place, nor would they have been internally consistent in seeking to advance them as important truths that other people should embrace" Feb 07, Robert rated it did not like it. View 1 comment. I wrote a long review on this one that disappeared due to computer malfunction.
I can't be bothered writing it again, but that is really a shame because this book is well worth engaging with. It attempts to find a balance between reductionism and strong constructivism by the means of critical realism and emergence theory.
Smith does this really well and I completely agree with his emphasis on 'person' as the starting point for understanding the human being. May 04, John Lussier rated it it was amazing Shelves: reads. A consideration of the concept of personhood in the field of sociology.
Smith constructs a personalist, critical-realist, and anti-foundationalist phenomological account of what it means to be a person. The interplay of these capacities like self-consciousness, a sense of the moral good, the use of language, etc. This new entity is not dependent on the full A consideration of the concept of personhood in the field of sociology. This new entity is not dependent on the full expression of these capacities, but only in the possibility of their existence. Included in this new entity is the idea of dignity and worth.
From this constructive effort Smith then goes on to show how various sociological methods are dependent on this model of personhood, but not explicit in their holding of it, deconstructing what he sees as gaps in the methods via his critical realist, personalist, and anti-foundationalist philosophy. Finally, Smith explores the concepts of structures as expressions of persons' creative uniqueness and limitations, the teleological end of persons human flourishing through love of neighbor , and the basis of human dignity.
May 26, Jeffrey Backlin rated it really liked it Shelves: sociology , philosophy. This is a great book. Somewhat academically dense for the uninitiated me , it still packs a punch and teaches well. Turner tended to stress communitarian themes when writing frontier history, asserting that Americans in primitive conditions had been forced to band together with their neighbors to form communities and democratic institutions. For other writers, however, frontier democracy for communities was less compelling than frontier freedom for individuals.
The mood among writers who celebrated frontier individualism was almost always nostalgic; they lamented not just a lost way of life but the passing of the heroic men who had embodied that life.
There he passes his days, there he does his life-work, there, when he meets death, he faces it as he has faced many other evils, with quiet, uncomplaining fortitude. Brave, hospitable, hardy, and adventurous, he is the grim pioneer of our race; he prepares the way for the civilization from before whose face he must himself disappear. Hard and dangerous though his existence is, it has yet a wild attraction that strongly draws to it his bold, free spirit. This nostalgia for a passing frontier way of life inevitably implied ambivalence, if not downright hostility, toward modernity and all that it represented.
If one saw the wild lands of the frontier as freer, truer, and more natural than other, more modern places, then one was also inclined to see the cities and factories of urban-industrial civilization as confining, false, and artificial. For all of its troubles and dangers, and despite the fact that it must pass away, the frontier had been a better place.
If civilization was to be redeemed, it would be by men like the Virginian who could retain their frontier virtues even as they made the transition to post-frontier life. The mythic frontier individualist was almost always masculine in gender: here, in the wilderness, a man could be a real man, the rugged individual he was meant to be before civilization sapped his energy and threatened his masculinity.
More often than not, men who felt this way came, like Wister and Roosevelt, from elite class backgrounds. The curious result was that frontier nostalgia became an important vehicle for expressing a peculiarly bourgeois form of antimodernism. The very men who most benefited from urban-industrial capitalism were among those who believed they must escape its debilitating effects. If the frontier was passing, then men who had the means to do so should preserve for themselves some remnant of its wild landscape so that they might enjoy the regeneration and renewal that came from sleeping under the stars, participating in blood sports, and living off the land.
The frontier might be gone, but the frontier experience could still be had if only wilderness were preserved. Wilderness suddenly emerged as the landscape of choice for elite tourists, who brought with them strikingly urban ideas of the countryside through which they traveled. For them, wild land was not a site for productive labor and not a permanent home; rather, it was a place of recreation. One went to the wilderness not as a producer but as a consumer, hiring guides and other backcountry residents who could serve as romantic surrogates for the rough riders and hunters of the frontier if one was willing to overlook their new status as employees and servants of the rich.
The irony, of course, was that in the process wilderness came to reflect the very civilization its devotees sought to escape.
Ever since the nineteenth century, celebrating wilderness has been an activity mainly for well-to-do city folks. Country people generally know far too much about working the land to regard unworked land as their ideal. In contrast, elite urban tourists and wealthy sportsmen projected their leisure-time frontier fantasies onto the American landscape and so created wilderness in their own image. There were other ironies as well, The movement to set aside national parks and wilderness areas followed hard on the heels of the final Indian wars, in which the prior human inhabitants of these areas were rounded up and moved onto reservations.
The actual frontier had often been a place of conflict, in which invaders and invaded fought for control of land and resources. Once set aside within the fixed and carefully policed boundaries of the modern bureaucratic state, the wilderness lost its savage image and became safe: a place more of reverie than of revulsion or fear. Meanwhile, its original inhabitants were kept out by dint of force, their earlier uses of the land redefined as inappropriate or even illegal. To return to my opening argument: there is nothing natural about the concept of wilderness.
It is entirely a creation of the culture that holds it dear, a product of the very history it seeks to deny.